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[Vol. 3

BANKRUPTCY-RECLAMATION ANI THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
I. INTRODUCTION

Bankruptcy is the crucible which may ultimately test the rights of a party in
any given commercial transaction. The various rights of an individual under the
Uniform Commercial Code' must therefore be viewed in light of the practical
results obtainable if bankruptcy should raise its head. This article will discuss
reclamation of personal property from the trustee of the bankrupt's estate and its
applicability under the Uniform Commercial Code. Reclamation is the process by
which a claimant asserts his title or claim to property in the hands of the bankruptcy trustee and attempts thereby to obtain possession 2 It is an important
aspect of bankruptcy proceedings, occasionally resulting in almost complete exhaustion of the bankrupt's marketable assets 3 Reclamation proceedings in bankruptcy and the Uniform Commercial Code interact in Article 2, when a vendor
attempts to obtain possession of goods from a bankrupt vendee, and in Article 9,
when a secured creditor attempts to assert a right to collateral in the possession
of the bankrupt debtor.
II. GENERAL ANALYSIS OF

RECLAMATION PROCEEDINGS

Reclamation proceedings in bankruptcy do not have a definite statutory
basis. 4 They developed out of attacks upon the trustee's title to property in his
possession. The trustee of a bankrupts estate is vested under section 70(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act 5 with the bankrupt's title to property. The property of a third
person, which is in the possession of the bankrupt, is not a part of the assets of the
bankrupt's estate and should be restored to the true owner. 6 Reclamation may thus
be based upon any number of claims to title; none of which are limited to bankruptcy proceedings.7 The key fact is that property subject to reclamation is not
the property of the bankrupt.
With the trustee in either actual or constructive possessior, a claimant initiates a reclamation proceeding by filing a petition with the bankruptcy court for
1. Chapter 400, RSMo 1965 Surp. The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE has
been adopted by 49 states and the District of Columbia. 1 CooGA, HoaN , &
VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE U.C.C. vii (1967).
2. 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
23.11 (14th. ed. 1966) (hereinafter cited as
COLLIER).

3. Blewett, First Meeting of Creditors, 14 REF. J. 11, 14 (1939).
4. MacLachlan, Protection and Collection of Property of Bankrupt Estates',
39 MINN. L. Riw. 626, 647 n.67. The Canadian statute on bankruptcy explicitly
sets forth reclamation procedure. Bankruptcy Act, 1 CAN. REv. STAT. c.14, 50

(1952).
5. 30 Stat. 544-66 (1898), as amended, 11 U. S. C. §§ 1-1255 (1964) (here-

inafter cited as Bankruptcy Act).
6. Thomas v. Taggart, 209 U.S. 385, 389 (1908); 4A COLLIER,

at 467.

7, 9 AM.

JUR.

70.39(1),

2d, Bankruptcy § 1194 (1963).
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the restoration of specific property.8 If that property has been sold by the
trustee, the claimant, if reclamation is granted, is entitled to the proceeds of such
sale.9 This remedy is exclusive, and a claimant may not institute a plenary suit
to obtain possession unless the consent of the bankruptcy court is obtained.' o
The petition should conform with the requirements of FED. R. Crv. PRo. 8(a)
and (e) by setting forth a concise statement of facts showing that the petitioner
is entitled to the relief requested."
There is no time limit specified in the Bankruptcy Act for filing a reclamation petition.' 2 However, the petition should be filed as early as possible, because the court has the power to limit the time by setting a reasonable date and
3
giving adequate notice thereof.'
The filing of a reclamation petition invokes the summary jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court. The court may therefore determine the claimant's rights or
title in a summary fashion, and, in this manner, pass upon all defenses which the
trustee may make to the petition.14 The court may, upon a proper counterclaim,
determine the rights of all parties connected with the transaction. 15 However,
the summary jurisdiction does not extend to adjudication of the petitioner's rights
on a totally unrelated matter.'8

8. For the form of reclamation petitions see 5 COLLIER, Form 823 p. 3681, and
Form 826 p. 3687.
9. Thomas v. Taggart, 209 U.S. 385, 389 (1908).
10. 2 COLLIER 23.11, at 587. A claimant may, however, bring suit against
the trustee personally for conversion, In re French, 18 F.2d 792 (W.D. Mich. 1927)
(sale of property during pendency of appeal as to question of title); Dawson v.
National Life Ins. Co., 156 Tenn. 306, 300 S.W. 567 (1927) (wrongful collection of
cash surrender value of exempt insurance policies), or for negligence in loosing
the property, I" re National Molding Co., 230 F.2d 69 (3rd Cir. 1956).
11. General Order 37, 11 U.S.C. App., requires that the FEDERAL RULES OF
CIvIL PRocEmu.E be followed in proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act "in so far
as they are not inconsistent with the Act...."
12. The time limit prescribed by § 57(n) of the Bankruptcy Act does not
apply. Nauman Co. v. Bradshaw, 193 Fed. 350 (8th Cir. 1912).
13. 4A COLLIER 70.39(2), at 472. Note that in the absence of knowledge or
notice or laches a bar order will not foreclose a reclamation petitioner from
asserting his right to the property in the trustee's possession. COLLIER, Op. cit.
supra at 472 n.20.
14. 9 AM. Jur. 2d Bankrmptcy, § 1199, at 890. The trustee may defeat the
reclamation petition by invoking, in a proper case, any of the powers or rights
conferred upon him by the Bankruptcy Act, including §§ 60, 67(a), 67(c), 67(d),
70(c) or 70(e). 4A COLLIER 70.39(1), at 467. This comment will not discuss
these avoiding powers. To do so would lead far beyond the scope of this article.
We will assume that the petition would not be vulnerable on these grounds. Anyone interested in this particular aspect should refer to 4A COLLIER op. cit. s.pa
at 468 n.8.
15. 2 COLLIER
23.08(5), at 549. However, the filing of a petition for
reclamation by the United States does not operate as consent to the assertion of
counterclaims upon the property. 2 COLLIER, op. cit. supra at 549 n.65. Nor may

the court adjudicate the rights of a third person who might have a right in the
property and who has not consented to the court's summary jurisdiction. 2
COLLIER, Op. cit. supra at 550.

16. 2 COLLIER

23.08(5), at 550.
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A reclamation petitioner may prevail only- upon the strength of his ownright to the property, and not on the weakness of the trustee's title.' 7 The peti-

tioner must be able to identify specifically the property sought to be reclaimed.
If the property has been mingled with other assets of the estaie and cannot be
traced, then the petitioner's reclamation effort will fail.' 8 The burden' of proof

is on the petitioner as to both the title to the property and its identity. 19
In accordance with General Order in Bankruptcy number 22,20 a proceeding
before the referee is governed by the Federal Rides of Civil Procedure. Thus, in
disposing of the reclamation petition, the referee is required to comply with FED.
R. Civ. PRO. 52(a) and state separately the findings of fact and the conclusions
of law thereon. The "clearly erroneous" rule is applicable in a review of the
referee's decision by the district court, 21 and the referee's decision, based upon
the credibility of the witness, will not be overturned unless there is clear evidency
of a miscarriage of justice.2 2 The reclamation proceeding has been held to give
rise to issues appealable under section 24(a) of the Bankruptcy Act "as controversies arising in proceedings in bankruptcy" and not as "proceedings in bankruptcy. '28 Appeals from the judgment of the district court are also subject to the
"clearly erroneous" rule.24 FED. R. Civ. PRO. 62(a) provides for an automatic
ten-day stay to allow time to appeal from the judgment of the district court.
During this time, the trustee may refuse to deliver the property to the claimant,
25
even though reclamation has been ordered.
When the reclamation claimant is successful, the costs of the proceeding will
be imposed upon the bankrupt's estate, and such expenses are considered part
17. Robbins v. Bostian, 138 F.2d 622 (8th. Cir. 1943).
18. 4A COLLIER 70.39(3), at 478.
19. 9 AM. JUR. 2d, Bankraptcy § 1201 (1963). Once the petitioner has sustained this burden of proving ownership and identity of the property he is seeking
to reclaim, then the trustee has the burden if reclamation is to be defeated on
the basis of fraudulent transfer. Trautwein v. Mandel, 127 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1942).
20. 11 U.S.C. App.
21. General Order 47, 11 U.S.C. App.
22. When the case is submitted to the referee on an agreed statement of fact
then the referee's findings do not carry as much weight, and the district judge
has more leaway in drawing inferences and reaching contra conclusions. In re Penn.
Table Co., 26 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.W. Va. 1939).
23. 2 COLLIER
24.31. "Controversies arising in proceedings in bankruptcy"
are appealable as a matter of right, but are only appealable as a final order. 2
COLLIER
24.27.
24. 2 COLLIER 25.30, at 966. In a case where the district judge has overruled the referee, the courts of appeal disagree as to the) effect to be given the
judge's decision. Some circuits hold that the question before the court in such
a situation is whether the referee's findings are dearly erronerous, not whether
the judge's findings are. Phillips v. Baker, 165 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1948); Morris
Plan Industrial Bank v. Henderson, 131 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1942). The Eighth
Circuit has held that the judge's findings will not be set aside unless it is clearly
erroneous. Katcher v. Wood, 109 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1940); In re Kansas City
ournal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1944). But cf. Sanitary Farm Dairies
I. v. Gammel, 195 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1952) (following rule of Morris Plan
Industrial Bank v. Henderson, supra).
25. United States ex rel. Manufactures Equip. Co. v. Rugh, 29 F. Supp. 40
(W.D. Pa. 1939).
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of the administrative expenses. 26 However the storage charges paid to protect
the property prior to filing of the reclamation petition and prior to its determina27
The claimant and the
tion are taxable to the claimant where he is successful
trustee may agree, prior to determination of .the petition's merits, to sell the
property and hold the funds subject to the reclamation determination, If this is
28
done, the claimant, if successful, is chargeable with the costs incident to the sale.
The filing of a proof of claim, either secured or unsecured, against the
bankrupts estate under section 572* is a distinct and separate process from filing
a reclamation petition.3 0 The issues are entirely different. A proof of claim is a
request to share in either the bankrupt's general assets (unsecured claim) or in a
specific asset of the bankrupt (secured claim). The reclamation petition is a demand that the claimant's own property be delivered to him. This distinction is an
important one to bear in mind, because under some circumstances the filing of a
proof of claim against the estate may be treated as a final election of remedies
and a waiver of the right to reclaim. 3 '
The filing of a proof of claim and entering into the selection of the trustee
after the reclamation petition was filed has been held to constitute a bar to the
continuance of the reclamation proceedings.32 If this reclamation petition is denied, then it may be too late to file a proof of claim, because the statutory sixmonths period of section 57(n) of the Bankruptcy Act has passed. Although the
33
court may treat a belated proof of claim as a reclamation petition, a reclamation
petition is not normally a sufficient basis for an amendment to a proof of claim
after the statutory period. 34 If the proof of claim contains an express statement
that it is intended only as an alternative to the right of restoration asserted under
the reclamation petition, and that the property rights are retained, then such has
been held not to be a waiver.3 5 The safe practice in a doubtful reclamation case
would be to file a reclamation petition and a timely proof of claim with an express
statement that it is an alternative remedy only, and that the property rights
claimed in the reclamation petition are reserved.
Reclamation, as discussed above, is an appropriate remedy when clearly
identifiable property of the claimant is in the possession of the trustees in bankruptcy. A necessary element of the reclamation petition, at least until the adoption
of the Uniform Commetcial Codea 6 has been that title be in the claimant.
70.39(5). Where the claimant is successful the claimant
26. 4A COLLIER
must pay the costs. 4A COLLIER, op. cit. supra at 480 n.54.

27. 4A

COLLIER

70.39(5).

28. 4A COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 27.
29. Bankruptcy Act.
30. Cf., Hopkins v. National Shawmut Bank of Boston, 293 Fed. 884 (5th
Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 722 (1923).

31. See 4A
32.
33.
34.
35.

COLLIER

70.38(4).

In re Myley Electrical Supply Co., Inc., 291 Fed. 775 (E.D. N.Y. 1923),
Bowman v. MacPherson, 93 F.2d 318 (10th Cir. 1937).
In re Peck & Hills Furniture Co., 10 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
Thomas v. Taggart, 209 U.S. 385 (1908).

36. For the effect of the

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

on the title require-

ment, see Part IV infra.
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Reclamation has been based upon a number of claims to title. It has been allowed
in a straight bankruptcy proceeding in the following situations: (1) where personal property has been delivered to the bankrupt under a sales agreement which
provided that title remain in the vendor until the entire purchase price had been
paid; (2) where personal property has been delivered to the bankrupt for a sale
or consignment; and (3) where personal property has been sold to the bankrupt
under such circumstances as to amount to a fraudulent representation of solvency,
and the vendor has been entitled to rescind the contract 3 7 In corporate reorganization proceedings, under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, reclamation has been
allowed in the past only if title was reserved to the petitioning vendor under a
conditional sales contract 35
The bankruptcy court is a court of equity, and it may impose various equitable
requirements that must be satisfied before return of property will be ordered, even
though the reclamation petition is approved. Courts have conditioned reclamation
upon return of payments actually made, less a reasonable allowance for use,
depreciation, and cost of repossession, where state law requires such as a condition
of repossession from a defaulted vendee by a vendor under a title retaining sales
agreement.39 One court, however, has refused to condition a reclamation order
upon the petitioner's payment to the bankrupt trustee of a sum due upon a matter
unrelated to the reclamation petition.40 The court, in another case, refused to extend the use of equitable powers to subordination of the petitioner's rights to those
of general creditors.4 1 One court also refused to create an equitable lien when a
statutory lien had not been created due to failure to comply with statutory requirements. 42 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Kansas City Journal
Post Co 4 s3 expressed doubts that equitable conditions could be imposed on a
petitioner whose title was absolute. This statement was dicta, however, and has
44
been criticized as innaccurate.
III.

RECLAMATION AND ARTICLE

2 OF

THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, the bankruptcy courts
had allowed a vendor to reclaim goods from the estate of a bankrupt vendee when
the sale was induced by fraud. The right to reclamation in this situation depended
upon whether, under state law, the vendor was entitled to rescind the sales
37. In re Broomhall, Killough & Co., Inc., 61 F.2d 760, 761 (2d Cir. 1932).
38. In re Lake's Laundry, 79 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S.
622 (1935).
39. Wilkin v. Heywood-Wakefield Co., 7 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1925) (dictum),
cert. denied, 271 U.S. 669 (1926); In re Hooven-Owens-Rentschler Co., 195 Fed.
424 (6th Cir. 1912); In re Price Drug Co., 19 F.2d 269 (E.D. Mo. 1927).
40. In re C. A. Goldsmith Co., 122 F. Supp. 19 (D.N.J. 1954) (denying
payment due for manufacturing of castins through use of reclaimed molds).
41. In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co., 144 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1944).
42. Colonial Trust Co. v. Goggin, 230 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1955).
43. 144 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1944) (dictum).
44.. 4A COLLIER 70.39(1), at 470 n.15; Oglebay, Some Developments in Bankrnptcy Law, 19 REF. J. 78 (1945).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1968], Art. 6

1968],

1 COMMENTS

contract.4 5 The bankruptcy trustee takes possession of the property subject to
the retroactive divestment of title effected by the rescission, and the intervention
of bankruptcy between the sale and the rescission had not been allowed to interfere
with the right to reclaim. 46 The rescission reverted title to the vendor and was the
basis for his reclamation petition.
The following types of conduct were grounds for reclamation after rescission
of the contract for fraud: 47 1) where the contract was induced by the bankrupt's
actively or tacitly concealing insolvency known to himself, regardless- of whether
intent not to pay for the goods can be established; 2) where, although not iisolvent, the bankrupt induced the contract by a bad faith, false and material
representation of his financial status; 3) where the bankrupt made an innocent
misrepresentation of his financial condition (this ground was extremely restricted
in its operation by the bankruptcy court). The right to rescind was limited by
defenses which avoided its exercise. In the absence of a duty to disclose, the
absence of a representation as to financial condition would bar rescission and
reclamation. 48
The Uniform Commercial Code eliminates the necessity of proving the element
of fraud. An objective standard for a conclusive right to reclaim the goods within
49
a limited time is provided by section 2-702(2):
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on
credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made
within ten days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has
been made to the particular seller in writing within three months before
delivery the ten-day limitation does not apply. Except as provided in this
subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer's
fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay.
It has been held that the seller need not actually reclaim the goods within ten
50
days following receipt, but only that demand be made within the time period.
While the Uniform Commercial Code eliminates the element of fraud, it
raises a question not normally present in the defrauded vendor situation under
pre-code law. 51 This question is whether or not the trustee in bankruptcy has
rights superior to those of the reclaiming vendor. The seller's right to reclaim under
section 2-702(2) is subjected to the rights of a lien creditor under section 2-702(3):
"The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a
buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser or lien creditor under this
Article (Section 2-403)." The code provides in section 2-403(4) that "[t~he rights
45. O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson Corp., 297 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1961).

46. 4A COLLIER 70.41(1), at 483. See cases cited in 4A COLLIER, op. Cit.
supra at 483 n.3.
70.41(1), at 486-7.
47. 4A COLLIER
48. 4A COLLIER 70.41(2).
49. RSMo 1965 Supp. (All subsequent citations to code sections will be to
Chapter 400, RSMo 1965 Supp. unless otherwise noted.).
50. Metropolitan Distributors v. Eastern Supply Co., 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 128
(Pa. Ct. C.P. 1959).
51. 4A COLLIER 70.41(1), at 491.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss2/6
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of lien creditors are governed by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article
9). . . ." Article 9 provides in section 9-301(3), that a lien creditor includes a
trustee in bankruptcy.
These provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code have been the subject
of great controversy and speculation. 52 It has been suggested53 that since the
seller in section 2-702 would not have a security interest as defined in section
1-201(37),54 there would be nothing to perfect under Article 9, and therefore a
lien creditor would not have any rights. As Collier points out, however, such an
interpretation would render unnecessary the cross referencing which ends up in
5
Article 9.5
The fear of the commentators that these cross references would result
in the application of the strong-arm provision of 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act to
prevent reclamation by the defrauded seller was realized in the case of In re
Kravitz.5 0
Kravitz was a Pennsylvania case which arose after the enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code in that state. A sale of radios on credit on January
16 was followed by delivery to the buyer on January 17. An involuntary petition
in bankruptcy against the buyer was filed on January 20, and the seller took the
necessary steps to rescind the sale on January 21. The court held that the seller
could not prevail against the trustee in bankruptcy. The Uniform Commercial
Code's according the trustee the position of a lien creditor in section 9-301(3) was
a recognition of the trustee's power as created by federal law. It was held that the
rights of a lien creditor depended upon state law. Pre-code Pennsylvania law, the
court said, gave a lien creditor a higher claim than that of a defrauded seller, and
the Uniform Commercial Code provisions did not change this.
The Kravitz case can be explained as based on peculiar pre-code Pennsylvania
law and not as meaning that under the Code the seller's right to reclamation under
section 2-702 is subject to the rights of a trustee in bankruptcy under section
9-301(3). At least one writer feels that such an interpretation would fly in the
face of the intention of the provision of the section. 57 Indeed, Comment 3 to section
2-702 of the 1962 Official Edition of the Uniform Commercial Code indicates that
such an interpretation would not be within the section's intention. Subsequent
cases have also subjected the reclamation rights of a defrauded seller* under this
section to the rights of the bankruptcy trustee.58
...

52. See, e.g., Braucher, Reclamation of Goods From a Fraudulent Buyer, 65
MrcH. L. REv. 1281 (1967); Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14
RuTmt.s L. Ray. 518 (1960); MacLachlan, Two Wrongs Make a Right, 37 TEXAs
L. REv. 676 (1959); Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HAuv. L. REv. 561 (1950).
53. See 4A COLLIER 70.41(1), at 488 n.16, and article cited therein.
54. The seller in this situation would not be likely to have created a security
interest because the transaction contemplated is essentially a sale on account and
not one of financing.
55. 4A COLLIER 70.62A(7.1), at 721.
56. 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
57. 1 U.C.C. REP. 160.
58. In re Units, Inc., 3 U.C.C. REP. 46 (D. Conn. 1965) (opinion by referee);
In re Eastern Supply Co., 1 U.C.C. REP. 151 (W.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd, 331,F2d 852
(3d Cir. 1964). The approach of the court in In re Eastern Supply Co., supra,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968
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The "lien creditor" of the Uniform Commercial Code, appears to be a con-

tractual lien creditor rather than a judicial lien creditor, i.e. an involuntary lien
of judgment or levy. The contractual lien is what Article 9 is primarily concerned
with. This is particularly relevant in this context, because the trustee's rights
under section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act are those of a judicial lien creditor.
If the trustee can defeat the vendor in reclamation, then it is only because state
law, the Uniform Commercial Code, gives him this right, but not because of his
powers under section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act.
The best solution to this problem would be to avoid it by deleting the phrase
"or lien creditor" from section 2-702(3). Seven states have deleted this phrase
from the section. 59 The Code's Permanent Editorial Board in 1966 recommended
that the sectibn be amended to eliminate the pharse and the cross reference.60
In Missouri section 400.2-702(3), RSMo 1965 Supp. includes the phrase "or
lien creditor." This can only have the effect of giving the defrauded seller an
illusory right. If bankruptcy should intervene, the phrase will prevent the sound
operation of the section.6 1 It would be desirable for the Missouri Legislature to
amend the section and delete the phrase before the courts are faced with a case
involving the problem.
In the absence of legislative action, it might be advisable to argue that precode Missouri law would not allow a subsequent lien creditor (trustee in bankruptcy) to cut off the rights of a defrauded seller to rescind the sale and reclaim
his property, and that the enactment of the Uniform Comimercial Code did not
change this. The Missouri Supreme Court has held that when a trustee in bankruptcy takes possession of the bankrupt's property, he takes it subject to the
equities to which the property is subject in the hands of the bankrupt. 62 There
are no reported Missouri decisions on reclamation from the bankrupts estate by
a defrauded seller. The Missouri courts have held that a vendor may rescind the
contract and reclaim his goods when they were purchased on credit by a vendee
who knew at the time that he was insolvent and who did not intend to pay for
them. 63 This indicates that Missouri does recognize the seller's right to rescind
might also prevent the seller from stopping delivery of goods in transit under
section 2-705. A receiver was appointed while the goods were still in the hands of
the carrier, but the goods were later delivered to the bankrupt. Reclamation was
denied under section 2-702(2) using the Karvitz approach. The court also said
that according to section 2-401(2) (a) title passed to the receiver (whose title the
trustee succeeded to) when the goods were delivered to the carrier. This reasoning,
if applied to a section 2-705 situation, would give the trustee rights not contemplated by the Code.
59. Illinois, New York, New Mexico, California, Maine, New Jersey, and
Connecticut. UNIFORV COMMERCIAL CODE (U.L.A.) § 2-702 (1962, SupP. 1967).
60. U.C.C. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD, 1966 OFFICIAL RECOMVIMENDATIONS
FOR AMENDMENT OF THE U.C.C. 1 (1967).
61. See Duesenberg, Title: Risk of Loss and Third Parties, 30 Mo. L. REv.

191, 210 (1965).
62. Blake v. Meadows, 225 Mo. 1, 123 S.W. 868 (1909).
63. Gratton & Knight Mfg. Co. v. Troll, 77 Mo. App. 339 (St. L. Ct. App.
1898); Moore & Bier v. Hinsdale, 77 Mo. App. 217 (K.C. Ct. App. 1898); Reid,
Murdock & Co. v. Lloyd & Moorman, 52 Mo. App. 278 (K.C. Ct. App. 1893);
Manheimer v. Harrington, 20 Mo. App. 297 (St. L. Ct. App. 1886).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol33/iss2/6
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and reclaim when there is fraud on the part of the buyer. Missouri has also held
that the rescission of a contract of sale after delivery of the goods is void as to
64
the vendee's creditors, because there was no fraud on the part of the vendee.
Would it not follow, that had there been fraud in the inducement of the sale that
rescission would not be void as against the vendee's creditors? The trustee in
bankruptcy is accorded the status of a judicial lien creditor.
In summary, we see that section 2-702 gives a defrauded seller a right of
reclamation, but that this right is perhaps illusory if bankruptcy intervenes. There
is a possible argument that pre-code Missouri law would allow the defrauded vendor
to succeed against a subsequent lien creditor. However, this is a weak argument
when you consider the particular wording of the Code which gives rise to the
problem. The ideal solution would be for section 400.2-702(3), RSMo 1965 Supp.
to be amended to delete the phrase "or lien creditor."6 5

IV.

RECLAMATION AND ARTICLE 9 OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

The right of a secured creditor, not in possession of collateral, to enforce his
security interest by reclamation from the bankrupts estate depends upon the
nature of the bankruptcy proceeding and the nature of the creditor's lien. It
would be well to distinguish between two conceptually different methods by which
a secured party may obtain his collateral from the bankrupt's estate. Reclamation
is one of these methods; as discussed previously, it is essentially a court proceeding. The other method is abandonment by the trustee. Abandonment is largely
within the discretion of the trustee. Neither abandonment nor reclamation depends
upon the secured creditor filing a claim against the bankrupts estate. 66 The
necessity to distinguish between abandonment and reclamation is due to the
different nature of the proof required to succeed under each. In reclamation the
issue is whether or not the petitioner has title to the property. In abandonment
the trustee must be convinced that the asset has no value or usefulness to the estate
due to its nature and the bankrupts equity in it. There is a tendency to blur
these two methods, with resulting confusion as to the issues involved in a particular situation.67
The creditor seeking reclamation of his collateral, prior to the Uniform Conmercial Code, had to prove that under state law title to the property remained
64. Tuttle v. Bracey-Howard Const. Co., 136 Mo. App. 309, 117 S.W. 86 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1909).
65. While not germane to the subject of the comment, there is an additional
hazard which may confront the defrauded seller reclaiming under section 400.2-702.
It has been held that a security agreement covering after acquired property will
cut off the right to reclaim as against the secured party because he is a good faith
purchaser given protection under section 400.2-702(3). In re Hayward Wollen Co.,
3 U.C.C. REP. 1107 (D. Mass. 1967); Evans Products Co. v. Jorgensen, 421 P.2d
978, 983 n.4 (Ore. 1966) (dictum).
66. "EL]ong established law that a secured creditor does not loose his security
by failing to file a claim in bankruptcy within statutory time." Clem v. Johnson,
185 F.2d 1011, 1013 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 909 (1951).

67. E.g.,

PROCEEDINGS

MULDER & FOREMAN,
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(1964).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1968

,.

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [1968], Art. 6

19681

COMMENTS

in him until the debtor's obligation was fulfilled. 68 The distinction, followed by
some states, between a conditional sale, with title retained by the vendor, and a
chattel mortgage, with title passing to the vendee, resulted in reclamation being
denied chattel mortgagees in some states.69 That reclamation turned upon where
"title" was located in a security transaction was severely criticized by Judge
Learned Hand as "a barren distinction."70
The Uniform Commercial Code presents a new dimension in this area by
abolishing technical distinctions between various security devices. Section 9-202
provides that "[elach provision of this Article with regard to rights, obligations
and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in
the debtor." Although not enacted into positive law, Comment 1 to section 9-50771
is very germane to our discussion. It provides that:
. ,. since this Article adopts neither a "title" nor a "lien" theory of
security interests... the granting or denying of, for example, petitions of
reclamation in bankruptcy proceedings should not be influenced by speculations as to whether the secured party bad "title" to the collateral or
'7

"merely a lien."

2

Thus, under the Uniform Commercial Code it does not matter whether the
security agreement is in the form of a conditional sale or a chattel mortgage. The
secured party, in either case, has the right to take possession of the collateral
upon default by the obligor 73 and dispose of it and apply the proceeds to the
indebtedness. 74
The old search for the location of "title" in a reclamation proceeding was
abandoned by the Second Circuit in the case of In re Yale Express System, nc. 5
This case involved a security interest in the form of a chattel mortgage executed
according to the New York Uniform Commercial Code, securing payment for
fifty trailers and sixty-two truck bodies purchased from the creditor, Fruehauf
Corporation. The purchaser, Yale Express System, Inc., had filed a petition for
reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. The district court denied
the petition for reclamation on the grounds that, irrespective of New York's adop68. E.g., In re Voight-Pros't Brewing Co., 115 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1940).
69. E.g., In re Lake's Laundry, 79 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied 296

U.S. 622 (1935).
70. In re Lake's Laundry, supra note 69, at 328 (L. Hand, J., dissenting).
71. A.L.I., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1962 Official Text).
72. It should be remembered that the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE is state
law, and bankruptcy is governed by federal statute. It is only where the Bankruptcy Act allows the court to refer to state law that the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE can affect the bankruptcy proceeding.
73. § 400.9-503. Query whether the secured party in the bankruptcy situation
could recover the collateral from the bankrupt's estate by self help as allowed by
this section. At least one case has held that a claimant may not acquire lawful
possession by simply taking the collateral without permission of the court or the
trustee. Operators' Piano Co. v. First Wisconsin Trust Co., 283 Fed. 904 (7th
Cir. 1922).
74. § 400.9-504(1).
75. 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966).
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tion of the Uniform Commercial Code, the distinction between a chattel mortgagd
and a conditional sale (and therefore the location of title) remained operative in
the determination of what property belonged to the bankrupt and what property
did not.76
The Second Circuit reversed, noting that the states, through the Uniform
Commercal Code, had abolished the technical distinctions between various security
devices, and then holding that the federal bankruptcy courts should no longer
engage in a "theoretical exercise" of locating title. The court said that:
It would be incongruous for the federal courts, historically the leaders
in the development of the law, to continue to employ anachronistic distinctions to determine whether a creditor is entitled to redeem property
held by the trustee when the overwhelming number of states have succeeded in bringing their laws more into line with commercial reality.77
In the case of In re United Thrift Stores, Inc.,78 the petitioner, in a proceeding
under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, was allowed reclamation upon a finding
of a valid security interest and agreement under the Code. In this latter case,
however, there was no discussion of the title problem.
The second factor which has influenced whether a secured party is entitled
to reclamation is whether the proceeding is one in straight bankruptcy, or whether
it is a proceeding under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. This factor is important
because the power of the bankruptcy court to interfere with the enforcement of
the security interest varies with respect to the nature of the proceeding. These
equitable powers have been relatively limited in a straight bankruptcy proceeding.10
The philosophy behind the straight bankruptcy proceeding is that of winding up
and liquidating the debtor's estate. The philosophy behind Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act is rehabilitation of the debtor; hence the court is given greater
equitable powers in handling the debtor's property.80 The provisions of straight
bankruptcy are made applicable to corporate reorganization under Chapter X by
section 102 of the Bankruptcy Act. The increased equitable powers available to
the court in a corporate reorganization under Chapter X arise from the traditional
powers available under common law equitable receivership, and from section 216
of the Bankruptcy Act which gives the court the power to change or modify the
rights of creditors.
Yale was a reorganization proceeding under Chapter X, of the Bankruptcy
Act. The court, in discarding the importance of the title situs, specifically stated
that "[e]quitable considerations and the substance of the transaction should
76. In re Yale Express Systems, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
77. In re Yale Express Systems, Inc., 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966).
78. 242 F. Supp. 714 (D.N.J. 1965), aff'd 363 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1966).
79. See notes 39 to 44 supra. See also King, Bankruptcy-Equitable Power of
Bankruptcy Court to Refuse Enfqrcement of Security Agreement Whichr it Finds
Unconscionable,32 Mo. L. REv. 284 (1967).
80. See 1 CooGAN, HOGAN & VAGrS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER U.C.C.,
§ 9.02 (1967).
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govern" s ' and remanded the case with directions for the lower court to examine
the equities to determine whether the bankrupt should be allowed to retain pos82
session of the trucks and trailers
The Second Circuit's acceptance of the Uniform Comomercial Code's idea of a
security interest which discards the concept of title, and its application to reclamation in a reorganization proceeding' under Chapter X of' the Bankruptcy Act, will
probably be followed by federal courts in straight bankruptcy proceedings. The
federal district court for the Eastern District of Missouri, in the case of In re
Jackson,83 allowed reclamation in a straight bankruptcy proceeding to a secured
creditor who held a "chattel mortgage security agreement" executed six days after
the Uniform Commercial Code became effective in Missouri. The court did not
discuss the title requirement problem.
The cases of Katcher v. Wood s4 and Trautwein v. Mandel,8 5 both of which
arose under pre-code Missouri law, also concern reclamation by a creditor of his
security from the bankruptcy trustee. The bankrupt in each case was an individual
and the proceeding was in straight bankruptcy. The security device in each
instance was a chattel mortgage. Reclamation was allowed without any discussion
of the title problem. Under pre-code Missouri law, title to mortgaged property
remained in the mortgagor prior to breach of conditions 8 6 After breach of conditions, the mortgagee was regarded as the absolute owner of the property covered
by the chattel mortgage.87 However, whether the mortgagee was entitled to reclaim
property upon which he held a chattel mortgage depended upon whether the
requirements of section 443.460, RSMo 1949 (repealed effective 1 July 1965) as
to filing had been properly complied with 88
A secured party should be able to draft his transactions in a manner such
that he will know in advance the results if his debtor ends up in bankruptcy.
The determination of reclamation by the application of equitable consideration,
which can not be identified in advance, is unfortunate-particularly when viewed
from the fact that most financing transactions which involve considerable sums
will be with a corporation as debtor. A corporation may voluntarily seek reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, which results in greater equitable
powers in the court. In any event, it is to be hoped that the part of the Yale
decision that makes equitable considerations increasingly important in the reorganization area will not transfer over to the straight bankruptcy situation. The
practical result of the use of equitable determination to govern whether the secured
81. In re Yale Express Systems, Inc., 370 F2d 433, 438 (2d Cir. 1966).
82. In re Yale Express Systems, Inc., supra note 81, at 439.
83. 268 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Mo. 1967).
84. 109 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1940).
85. 127 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1942).
86. Barnett v. Timberlake, 57 Mo. 499 (1874); Brandtjen & KJuge v. Hunter,
235 Mo. App. 909, 145 S.W2d 1009 (Spr. Ct. App. 1940); Olean Milling Co.-v.
Tyler, 208 Mo. App. 430, 235 S.W. 186 (K.C. Ct. App.' 1921).
87. Robinson v. Campbell, 8 Mo. 365 (1843).
88. See In re Patterson, 139 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
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party will be allowed reclamation of his collateral is to make a question mark of
his rights under section 9-503.
A secured creditor, after the Yale decision, can reclaim his collateral from
the trustee's possession by proving a perfected security interest 8 9 If the proceeding is in straight bankruptcy, then the equitable powers of the referee are rather
limited. If the proceeding is one of reorganization, then after Yale the secured
creditor might face greater equitable powers in the hands of the bankruptcy court.
V. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Commercial Code is an appropriate source of law in a proceeding
to reclaim property from the bankrupt's estate. Section 2-702 gives a defrauded
seller a right under state law to recover his goods. Until the phrase "or lien
creditor" is removed from section 2-702(3), this right will be illusory if bankruptcy
intervenes. The code's rejection of a title theory has been accepted by the federal
courts in the Yale case. A secured creditor may recover his security from the bankruptcy trustee by proving his perfected security interest. He does not need to
concern himself with the technical location of title. However, the uncertainties which
may result from an application of greater equitable powers by the bankruptcy court
may prove to be more troublesome than the "sterile" game of "locating title."
HUGH MCPHEErERs, JR.

89. It should be noted that a security interest is subject to attack under all
the varied powers of the bankruptcy trustee, this discussion has assumed that it
would not be vulnerable.
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